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Abstract
Cross-class mobilization in developing countries can be a powerful force for precipitating political change, but the literature on cross-class protest movements in developing
countries has focused almost exclusively on democratization movements and has not dealt
adequately with cross-class protest in other contexts. Additionally, the literature on protest
movements typically focuses on the lower classes, while the upper classes are either ignored
or assumed to be one-dimensional, uniform, self-interested actors who only protest when
it is in their own best economic and political interest. These deficiencies in the literature
have been illuminated by the massive protests that occurred in Guatemala in 2015. In
a country with a long history of class antagonism, rigid social and racial cleavages, and
drastic inequality, how did Guatemalans in the upper classes find common ground and
solidarity with those in the lower classes? Existing literature on cross-class protests in
developing countries is sparse, and argues that cross-class protests only emerge in developing countries during democratization, or in times of extreme economic problems. This
paper is a preliminary investigation into the 2015 protests in Guatemala that critiques the
literature on cross-class protests in developing countries, and especially in Latin America,
by providing evidence obtained from interviews regarding the motivations of protesters
in the upper classes. It argues that the standard image of the upper classes in developing countries as one-dimensional, uniform, rational actors is inadequate and inaccurate.
Rather, they have complex motivations ranging from self-interest, to nationalism, to altruistic concern for the poor. While the findings in this paper are preliminary due to a small,
non-representative sample, they reveal the need for a larger, more comprehensive project
to investigate cross-class protester motivations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Under what conditions do cross-class protests occur in developing countries? The
massive protests that occurred in Guatemala in 2015 have brought this question, largely
abandoned in the literature from the 1990’s until the Arab Spring, to the forefront. The
existing theories argue that the interest of the lower and upper classes rarely align, and are,
in fact, typically categorically opposed to one another. Governments normally align with
the upper classes against the lower classes, leading the poor to protest frequently and the
upper classes to remain content with the status quo (Foweraker, 2001). Therefore, it is only
extreme and trying circumstances, namely democratic transition from an autocracy and
dire economic problems, that can bring the motivations of the lower and upper classes into
alignment and allow them to mobilize in solidarity with each other (Haggard and Kaufman,
1995).
However, the Guatemalan protest movement in 2015 does not follow this logic. The
Guatemalan economy was not undergoing severe problems and Guatemala is already a
democracy. According to the existing literature, cross-class protests should not have occurred in Guatemala in 2015, rather, the upper classes should have remained neutral or
sided with the government (Alves, 2001). It is apparent, therefore, that the existing literature on cross-class protests is inadequate to explain what happened in Guatemala in 2015,
and that more research needs to be conducted in order to better understand cross-class
protest movements. In this study, I construct a new, richer explanation for cross-class
protests and, borrowing from insights from psychology, I argue that the motivations of the
upper classes are complex, and consist of a combination of egoism, altruism, and collectivism. I interview members of the Guatemalan upper classes who protested in 2015 to test
my hypothesis, and I find that the motivations of members of the upper classes did indeed
encompass the hypothesized motivations.

1

This project is constructed as follows. In section one I examine the extant literature
on cross-class protest in developing countries, focusing on Latin America. In section two I
give a brief history of Guatemala to show its history of class antagonism, ending with a description of the ‘La Linea’ corruption scandal and the subsequent protests. I then examine
the current state of affairs in Guatemala to show that the conditions for cross-class protest
predicted in the literature were not present in Guatemala in 2015. Section two concludes
by arguing that the current theories of cross-class protest are inadequate because they fail
to account for the 2015 protest in Guatemala, and that a new, more comprehensive theory of protester motivation is needed to explain what happened. Section three explains
and defends the interview method that I use to examine protester motivations. Section
four examines and explains the responses from the interviewees and shows that, contrary
to the extant scholarship, the wealthy have complex motivations for protesting that do
not fit within the realist paradigm. The conclusion synthesizes and summarizes the argument made in the paper, and lays out a framework for a more complete study of wealthy
motivations in Latin America.
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Chapter 2
Literature and Theory of Cross-Class Protest in Developing
Countries
The literature on cross-class protests in developing countries may be divided into two
categories: explanations for why cross-class protest does not frequently occur, and explanations for why it sometimes does occur.1 Within the explanations for why cross-class
protest does not occur, there are four general arguments: (1) grievance theory, (2) opposed
interest theory, (3) political access theory, and (4) organization theory. These should not
be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as interrelated factors that all contribute to the
rarity of cross-class protest.
Grievance theory argues that grievances against the government spur protests. Grievances
can take the form of relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Berkowitz,
1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Grievance theory is crucial to any study of
protest movements because “[a]t the heart of every protest are grievances, be they the experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, moral
indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance” (Stekelenburg
and Klandermans, 2013).
Grievance motivation is seen as a cleavage between the upper and lower classes. Frank
and Fuentes (1987) state that “[i]n the Third World, social movements are predominantly
popular/working class,” because the poor “are much more absolutely and relatively subject
to deprivation and (felt) injustice, which mobilizes them in and through social movements.”
Oliver (2013) argues that the lower classes protest more often than the upper classes because
the lower classes typically have more grievances against the government than the upper
classes. Governments tend to repress minority groups more than majority groups because,
if groups are assumed to only protest repression in their own self interest, governments can
1

The distinction between developing and developed countries is crucial. Studies have shown that in
developed countries, the educated and the wealthy actually out-represent the poor in mass protest (Aelst
and Walgrave, 2001), a finding that is exactly the opposite of the empirical record in developing countries.
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repress minority groups at a low cost. This is widely applicable in Latin America because a
large portion of the lower classes is made up of indigenous groups, and indigenous groups are
among the most frequent protesters in Latin America (Booth and Seligson, 2006; Garreton,
1989; Oxhorn, 2003; Chernick, 2003; Yashar, 1998; Jackson and Warren, 2005; Eckstein,
1989; Nash, 1989; Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley, 2003). The wealthy, on the other hand,
are almost exclusively Europeans and Ladinos, which together make up a Spanish-speaking
majority in most Latin American countries. Thus, grievance theory suggests that the
lower classes, who are subjected to relative deprivation and repression, and who are more
adversely affected by repression due to poverty, tend to protest much more frequently than
the upper classes who tend to have relative plenty, do not face as much repression, and are
less adversely affected by repression.
While grievance theory explains the differing negative effects of repression on the different classes, some scholars have also noted that the upper and lower classes have positive
differences that inhibit cross-class mobilization, which manifest as the problem of opposed
interests. Nelson (1990) argues that the interests of the poor and wealthy are typically
opposed to one another, thus, when one protests or pushes for a change, the other instinctively opposes it. If the government redistributes more to the poor, such a move typically
involves greater taxation on the rich. If the government eases taxation on the rich, it usually
results in fewer resources for the poor. As she states, “political incentives for governments
to help the very poor are usually weak. Indeed, measures that shift resources away from
middle deciles or wealthier groups to help the poor provoke political opposition” ( 232).
Under normal circumstances, the state chooses to side with the interests of the wealthy
and powerful. Foweraker (2001) asserts that “class struggles typically pit the poor against
the state” (848), and generally, the upper-middle class is in between the deprived poor
and the economic elite and remains neutral or passively sides with the government (Alves,
2001). This serves to create a dichotomy of rich and poor, or upper and lower classes whose
interests are categorically opposed to one another.
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The result of opposed interests is that even when the upper classes do protest, they
are typically still opposed to the lower classes, which means that cross-class protest still
does not occur. An excellent example of this phenomenon is the Rosenberg protests in
Guatemala, in which upper class Guatemalans protested the government while lower class
Guatemalans counter-protested in support of the government. I will examine this case in
more detail later in this paper.
Given the categorical opposition of the upper and lower classes in most of Latin America, one might expect that more protests would occur in which the rich took part, even
if they opposed the interests of the poor. Yet, with some exceptions aside, the wealthy
do not frequently protest. This phenomenon may be explained by the third theory, which
deals with political access, a sub-theory of social location theory (Morris and Braine, 2001).
Oliver (2013) argues that the upper classes tend to have better access to existing channels of political action, so they have no need of protest. According to this argument, the
upper classes are more likely to have access to, and utilize other means of influence, such
as personal connections, campaign donations, etc. If mass mobilization and street protest
are seen as last-resorts for people demanding change, people with less access to alternative
means of communicating their needs to the government are more likely to protest, and vice
versa.
Organization theory, like political access theory, deals with external factors affecting
protests. Proponents of this theory argue that sustained mass mobilization requires high
levels of organization (Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Almeida, 2014; Nelson, 1990). Labor
unions, indigenous groups, and other large, organized groups are typically responsible for
empirical instances of mass mobilization, while mass mobilizations that begin more spontaneously tend to quickly peter out. However, upper class individuals are far less likely
to belong to these types of organizations than lower class individuals. The result is that,
though some countries, like Guatemala, experience many organized protests, they are almost exclusively organized by labor unions and indigenous groups whose members are in
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the lower classes. Interestingly, even examples of protests involving the upper classes in
the empirical record tend to bear out this argument, as they are typically organized around
the few types of organizations to which members of the upper classes belong, namely professional organizations like doctors, professors, and lawyers, and student/professor groups
from universities.
Despite their rarity, cross-class protests do sometimes occur. Within the literature
that explains why cross-class protests sometimes occur, there are two theories of causal
factors: political interests and economic interests. Again, these are not mutually exclusive,
but rather complementary and interrelated. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) argue that
cross-class protests occur when there is a movement away from autocracy and towards
democracy, and/or when there is an extreme economic downturn. Citing evidence gathered
from case studies of Brazil, Argentina, the Philippines, Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay, they
argue that the upper and lower classes were able to unite only because they had common
ground regarding political rights and the severe economic recession resulting from austerity
measures. Scholars have added to each of these, resulting in the rich theoretical frameworks
of economic grievance theory and democratization theory.
Haggard and Kaufman (1995) were not the first to argue that the severe economic
recessions due to austerity measures were responsible for the massive cross-class protests
that occurred in Argentina and Brazil. Walton (1989) and Walton and Ragin (1990) argue
that the effects of austerity measures on the populations of Latin America were so severe
that they affected even sections of the upper classes, resulting in massive demonstrations in
which both the upper and lower classes were represented. This makes sense from a grievance
theory standpoint. As Snow and Soule (2009) point out, economic threats often serve as
“mobilizing grievances” for collective action campaigns. While the upper classes do not
protest often because they do not have many serious grievances against the government, if
the economic conditions become so poor that even normally affluent individuals begin to feel
the effects, the upper classes may be able to find common grievance with the lower classes
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against the government. If the upper classes are assumed to be rational actors, that is, to
think only in terms of their own best interest, then it follows that only in extraordinarily
trying circumstances, such as hyperinflation, would the upper classes protest.
Manzetti and Wilson (2006) extend the economic argument in a way that is particularly
salient to the 2015 protests. They hold that corruption alone is not usually enough to
generate mass protests against the government. Instead, corruption only infuriates the
public to the point of protesting if it accompanies poor economic performance. If the
economy is performing poorly, corruption will be much more salient for a large portion of
the people because they will be more likely to perceive that the corruption is negatively
impacting their lives, and, thus, they will be more likely to seek to punish the government
through demands for resignations and regime change.
The other explanation for cross-class protest given in the literature falls under democratization theory. Democratization is the political side of the dichotomy of motivations
from Haggard and Kaufman (1995). According to this theory, upper and lower classes may
unite to demand democracy if both classes see it as being in their own best interest to do so.
This is what is usually seen as the impetus for the Arab Spring, as well as democratization
movements in the 1980’s and 90’s (Goldstone, 2011; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). There is
some overlap with the economic argument because economic collapse can also be a trigger
for democratization, as people lose faith in the competency of the regime. There are four
central hypotheses that make up the “cross-class protest for democratization” literature
(Slater, 2009). First, some see economic development as the driving factor behind protests
to confront authoritarian repression; the upper and lower classes may push for democracy
if they see it as a means to develop and expand economic opportunity (Huntington, 1991;
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992). A second socioeconomic explanation identifies economic crisis as the most likely trigger for mass mobilization in favor of democracy
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). A third explanation argues
that stolen elections are the strongest impetuses for democratic uprisings (Schedler, 2006,
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2007; Thompson and Kuntz, 2004; Tucker, 2007). Finally, some scholars have claimed that
international diffusion, or contagion theory, is the best explanation for the phenomena of
democratic revolutions against dictatorships (Beissinger, 2007).
In summary, the conditions that scholars have identified as prerequisites for crossclass protest are extremely poor economic conditions and/or democratization. In the next
section, I give a brief history of Guatemala from the 1950’s until 2015, focusing on its
long history of class tensions, and show that the hypothesized conditions considered to
be necessary for cross-class protests to occur did not exist in 2015. I will then argue
that a reexamination of the rationalist assumptions behind cross-class protest literature is
necessary to enrich the literature and account for the 2015 protests. Though the logic of
democratization and economic collapse being triggers for cross-class protest is sound, it is
too limited and only accounts for part of the explanation for the 2015 protests.

8

Chapter 3
Guatemala: A Case Study
3.0.1

1954-2015

Guatemala is a country well suited for case studies in political science because its recent
history so closely resembles that of most other Latin American countries, and even developing countries in other parts of the world, particularly former colonies. The basic sequence
of events in Guatemala also played themselves out in many other countries: colonization, de-colonization, democratization, foreign intervention and de-democratization, and
re-democratization. In 1954 an American backed coup ousted the democratically elected
President Arbenz after he tried to implement drastic land reform through a redistribution
of land to the poor. The ouster was supported by transnational companies like the United
Fruit Company (UFCO) and wealthy land owners. The country soon devolved into a civil
war that pitted the military and economic elites against guerrillas who were predominantly
indigenous peasants and poor Ladinos, while the middle and upper-middle classes tended
to remain neutral, passively backing the status quo (Leonard, 1991).1 In the 1980’s, the
military government ordered the systematic killing of tens of thousands of indigenous peoples who were purported to be in league with the guerrillas, utilizing the tactic known as
“draining the sea to kill the fish”. This period has been labeled a genocide in which an
estimated 200,000 people were killed (Esparza, Huttenbach and Feierstein, 2009).
The situation in Guatemala improved immensely in the 1990’s during the country’s
democratic transition in which political freedoms were expanded, political kidnappings and
paramilitary death squads ceased operation, and even the indigenous peasants received suffrage. However, despite democratizing and implementing a social safety net, huge problems
remain. Public healthcare is notoriously horrific in Guatemala (Stafford, 2015). Allegations concerning expired medicines, filthy conditions, insufficient supplies, and corruption
1

The exception to this was the guerrilla leadership, which consisted primarily of radicalized college
students and young military officers, both of whom were from the middle and upper classes. However,
these were very few in number.
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are rampant. Crime prevention in Guatemala is just as bad as healthcare; bribing police
officers is often the only way to get help from them. The homicide rate is one of the worst
in the world (OSAC, 2015), and it is estimated that 98% of them go unsolved; this is not
surprising considering that much of the modern police force consists of former members of
the civil war-era police and military, a group associated with many human rights abuses
(Isaacs, 2010). Education is little better: “It is estimated that less than 15% of classrooms
nationwide meet minimum standards for classroom space, teaching materials, classroom
equipment and furniture, and water/sanitation. In the rural villages of Guatemala, that
percentage drops to 0%” (Avivara, N.d.).
The economy in Guatemala, though considered to be underperforming given its potential, is relatively stable and productive. It is the largest economy in Central America
and it boasted a 3-4.1% growth rate from 2012 to 2015 (Worldbank.org, 2017). Despite
its relatively healthy economy, Guatemala has some of the highest rates of maternal-child
mortality, poverty, inequality, and malnutrition in the world, indicating that its economic
production is not benefiting the majority of the population. For most Guatemalans, these
issues are part of every day life. However, the upper classes, as the primary beneficiaries
of the economic growth, enjoy a much better standard of living, and are able to bypass
many of these problems through private healthcare, living in safer areas and/or paying for
bodyguards, and sending their children to private school.
Given the issues facing the country, it comes as no surprise that protests by the poor
against the government are common. According to Mass Mobilization Protest Database,
there were 312 documented protests in Guatemala from 1990-2014 (MMDP, 2014). Many
of these protests were violent and pitted indigenous Guatemalans against the government
or large landowners and transnational corporations. Before democratization most of the
protests focused on human rights, particularly indigenous rights, a common theme throughout the region during the Cold War era (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley, 2003), but since
the early 2000’s, they, along with protests in many other Latin American countries, have
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mostly focused on resisting globalization, privatization, and free trade (Almeida, 2014).
Though the upper classes do not have the same economic grievances as the poor, they
do still occassionally protest other grievances. One of these events was mentioned earlier
in this paper and serves as an excellent example of the rigid nature of class in Guatemala,
emphasizing the fact that the interests of of upper and lower class citizens rarely align.
This series of protests is known as the Rosenberg protests.
Rosenberg was an opposition lawyer in Guatemala who was gunned down in the street.
He had made a video before his death saying that if he was murdered, it was the populist
president, Alvaro Colom, who was responsible. Though later judged by the UN (inconclusively) to have been staged, the video sparked a wave of protests composed almost
exclusively of white, middle and upper class urbanites. Scholars have generally seen the
Rosenberg protests as an example of class divisions in Guatemala; white urbanites felt
threatened by the populist government when a member of the upper class, someone they
identified with, was supposedly murdered, while the poor and indigenous actually counterprotested on behalf of a president they trusted against a class of elites who they distrusted
(Isaacs, 2010).

3.0.2

La Linea and the 2015 Protests

In April 2015, the UN-sponored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala,
known in Guatemala by its Spanish acronym CICIG, uncovered a massive corruption scandal dubbed La Linea (The Line). It revealed that large numbers of government officials,
including both the president and the vice president, were involved in the scandal, which
centered around a customs scam by which private companies paid government officials
millions of dollars in bribes in exchange for falsification of shipping records that reduced
or eliminated the company’s tariff liabilities (Ahmed and Malkin, 2015; teleSUR, 2016;
Molina, 2015). Within weeks, another scandal emerged involving the Guatemalan Social
Security Administration. It involved officials who over-ordered ineffective pharmaceutical
medications in exchange for bribes from the pharmaceutical company. It was responsible for
11

$14.5 million in fraudulent records and the deaths of at least 11 people due to renal failure
from not getting the proper medications (Wirtz, 2015; Pachico, 2015; teleSUR, N.d.). As a
result of these two scandals, outraged Guatemalans took to the streets in peaceful protest.
Every weekend from April through October the central square in Guatemala City was filled
with tens of thousands of protesters from many different social strata. Their demand for
the president was terse and unequivocal: “Renuncia Ya” (Resign Now), echoing Brazilian protesters’ rallying cry in the 1980’s, “Direitas Ja”.2 Some of the officials involved in
the scandals resigned, including Roxana Baldetti, the vice president, while others fled the
country. The movement climaxed with the resignation of Otto Perez Molina, the president
of Guatemala, and a vote by the legislature to strip him of impunity (Castañeda, 2016).
The purpose of this brief history of Guatemala is to provide context to, and underscore
the highly unusual, if not entirely unprecedented cross-class protests in 2015, in which
the upper classes joined forces with their poor and indigenous countrymen against the
government; and to show that neither of the two factors identified in the literature as
being capable of catalyzing cross-class protests — economic collapse and democratization
— were present in Guatemala in 2015. There was no great economic calamity on the
scale of the austerity measures of the 1980’s to motivate the upper classes to protest,
and Guatemala had been a democracy for 19 years in 2015, making the democratization
motivation untenable as well. How, then, can the 2015 protests be explained? I argue that
there are two parts to the explanation. The first part is found in the logical foundation
of democratization literature, while the second part lies in individual psychology and a
combination of altruism, nationalism, and egoism.
2

Though protests took place throughout the country, my project focuses exclusively on Guatemala City,
the most populous city in Guatemala where most of the upper classes live. All of the detailed reporting
I could find focused on Guatemala City, so I have no evidence that cross-class protests occurred in other
areas of Guatemala.
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3.0.3

Democratization Theory

While Guatemala was already a democracy in 2015, the logic that underpins scholars’
assertions that democratization can motivate cross-class protest may still be applied in a
limited and circuitous form to account for a portion of the explanation for the protests.
Democratization most directly refers to the movement from an autocratic to a democratic
system of government; the literature on cross-class protests uses democratization in just
this sense. However, as many scholars have noted, democracies exist on a spectrum, so
democratization can also refer more broadly to fluctuations that a country undergoes along
the democratic spectrum. In the literature, it is the initial transition from autocracy
to democracy that provides the impetus for cross-class protest, as in Brazil, Argentina,
and the Philippines, while the fluctuations that make a developing country more or less
democratic are not considered to be related to cross-class protest. This is not due to
scholarly neglect, but rather to a lack of empirical opportunity. As Foweraker writes of
the cross-class protests that occurred throughout Latin America during democratization,
“[n]o comparable cycle of protest or peak of mobilization has occurred since the democratic
transitions” (Foweraker, 2001, p. 848). However, mobilization scholars’ exclusive focus on
the transition from autocracy to democracy to explain cross-class protest, while ignoring
internal fluctuations along the democratic spectrum, is too limited. I argue that fluctuations
of “democraticness” within democracies have some explanatory power for understanding
recent cross-class protests, such as the one in Guatemala.
In 1996, Guatemala held its first truly democratic election in 40 years, ending the 36
year civil war that had dominated the country’s political scene since 1960. It represented
a dramatic shift in a country that had been ruled by military dictatorships. Positive
changes that occurred from the initial democratization included the expansion of political
freedoms and a reduction of political kidnappings, assassinations, and disappearances that
had characterized Guatemala in the 1980’s and 90’s. However, progress towards a more
democratic state petered out, and the next 19 years were characterized by an entrenchment
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of corruption and a solidification of the old guard of economic and military elites who
operated with legal impunity under the guise of democracy (Isaacs, 2010). For example,
though Guatemala succeeded in reducing its poverty rate from 56% in 2000 to 51% in 2006,
it quickly regressed and the poverty rate soared to 59% in 2014 (Worldbank.org, 2017).
Following Tilly’s characterization of democratization and de-democratization as backand-forth fluctuations (Tilly, 2007), I argue that after the initial push for democracy,
there followed a long period of steady de-democratization, characterized not by a countermovement, but by an entrenchment of corruption from the military governments that was
never eliminated. For example, the military government had actually started La Linea before democratization in 1996. It was able to survive and grow because the same people and
networks were still in power under democracy as had been under the military government
(ex-president Molina himself is ex-military). According to Tilly (2003), de-democratization
can occur when there is an increase in categorical inequality, which refers to the inequality
of access to government officials. Corruption, the redistribution of resources by government officials to themselves and their allies, is toxic for democracy; in fact, “the presence
of political corruption and administrative inefficiency fundamentally defeats the purposes
of representative democracy” (Adsera, Boix and Payne, 2003, p. 446). Guatemala’s systemic corruption increases categorical inequality because it privileges those who are able
to pay bribes, such as large corporations and very wealthy individuals. As a country gets
less democratic, the population that benefits from the privileges gets smaller, and as the
privileged class shrinks, a larger swath of classes becomes part of the out-group, alienating
ever larger numbers of people. If the de-democratization process goes too far, greater numbers of the upper classes will no longer be content with the status quo, and the conditions
become more amenable to cross-class protest. Thus, La Linea was the culmination of a slide
towards de-democratization, and the 2015 protests may be seen as representing a renewed
surge back towards democratization in Guatemala.
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The second area of democratization theory that applies to my argument comes from
regime change theory (Boix, 2003). Although Guatemala has universal suffrage, the corruption that characterizes its government makes the government behave more as an autocratic
regime in which resources are distributed to a small, elite class of individuals, rather than a
democratic regime in which resources are distributed more evenly. Thus, voting is a facade
intended to lend legitimacy to the regime; it is an attempt to mask the true authoritarian nature of the government by giving it the appearance of a democracy. In reality, the
government institutions that are the fruit of redistributive democracy, such as free public healthcare, are so underfunded as to exist in name only. The revelations of La Linea
represent the unveiling of the shroud of democracy that had been wrapped around the
authoritarian regime in which government officials redistributed resources to themselves,
not through legislation or open policy, but through a system of bribes and tax fraud. The
appearance of democracy had made the cost of repression much lower than it had been
during the civil war because it made the people think that the government was working
in their best interest, enabling it to repress without costly violence. The success of the
2015 protests, then, may be seen as a response to a rapid increase in the cost of repression,
due to revelations of endemic corruption, that exceeded the government’s ability or willingness to pay, resulting in regime change. When the extent of the corruption was revealed,
Guatemalans across classes found that they were not part of the privileged group that was
part of the government’s autocratic distribution scheme. Therefore, they found common
grievance together against the government. The corruption revelations served to give them
more knowledge about how the regime was operating, and “[a]s citizens have more precise
knowledge about both the policies adopted by politicians and the environment in which
they are implemented, the policy makers have less room to deviate resources to themselves
(Adsera, Boix and Payne, 2003, p. 448).
It is my contention that these two processes — de-democratization and the removal
of the shroud of democracy — help to explain why cross-class protests happened in a
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developing democracy without a severe economic crisis. However, this alone is not enough.
The literature is clear that cross-class protests in developing countries only occur when the
upper and lower classes both find it in their best interests to do so. While the lower classes
protest frequently, it is much more rare for the upper classes to join them because it is
rarely in their best interest. Thus, something dramatic must occur for the upper classes
to forsake the status quo, such as sudden economic collapse or authoritarian repression.
Although the theory outlined above can explain part of the motivation for the upper classes
to protest, the corruption scandal did not touch the lives of enough people in the upper
classes directly and severely enough to motivate them to join the lower classes in protest.
As shown later, all of the individuals I interviewed were aware of widespread corruption
in the government before the La Linea scandal was revealed, affirming observations by
Canache and Allison (2005) that the public in Latin America is very well aware of the
corruption that characterizes their governments. It is therefore my contention that the
knowledge of extant corruption served to foment discontent that bubbled just under the
surface, but the knowledge of corruption alone was not enough to compel the upper classes
to demonstrate. It provided tinder, but not a spark. The second half of my argument fills
in this gap and shows that the literature cannot account for the 2015 protests because of
its exclusive reliance on rational choice and class-based theory.

3.0.4

Individual Psychological Motivation Theory

Slater (2009) argues that the theories of collective action of democratization rely exclusively on rational choice theory, and need to be broadened to include individual psychological motivations, such as nationalism. Rational choice limits the discussion of cross-class
protest by restricting the conversion to class-based self-interest as a motiving factor. By
focusing on rational choice, existing theory ignores the possibility that actors may act
contrary to their own economic best interest. It is this limitation, I argue, that prevents
existing theory from being able to explain the 2015 protests in Guatemala. If the upper
classes are assumed to only protest in their own economic best interest, and further as16

sumed to identify primarily with their own economic class rather than other groups, then
the protests in 2015 do not make sense. It would be hard to argue that it was in the
economic best interest of the Guatemalan upper classes to spend their weekends protesting
a regime that was term limited and set to leave office at the end of the year; or that it was
in their best interest to protest corruption because of the decadent state of public services
like healthcare and policing, when they can afford private healthcare and security.
What, then, motivated upper class Guatemalans to join their fellow citizens in the
lower classes to protest the government if not solely self-interest? Batson and Powell (2003)
argue that “[t]he dominant motivational theories in psychology, sociology, economics, and
political science are firmly founded on assumptions of universal egoism” (464), but that
“[p]ending new evidence or a plausible new egoistic explanation of the existing evidence ...
It appears that the empathy-altruism hypothesis should — tentatively — be accepted as
true” (476). Thus:
If individuals feeling empathy act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of
increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism must
be replaced by a more complex view of motivation that allows for altruism as
well as egoism. Such a shift in our view of motivation requires, in turn, a revision
of our underlying assumptions about human nature and human potential. It
implies that we humans may be more social than we have thought — that other
people can be more to us than sources of information, stimulation, and reward
as we each seek our own welfare. To some degree and under some circumstances,
we can care about their welfare as an end in itself (476-77).
Additionally, scholars suggest that aside from altruism and egoism, there is another motivating force: collectivism (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Tajfel, 1981; Turner et al., 1987).
“Collectivism involves motivation to benefit a particular group as a whole. The ultimate
goal is not to increase ones own welfare or the welfare of the specific others who are benefited; the ultimate goal is to increase the welfare of the group.” (Batson and Powell, 2003,
p. 476-77). Indeed, Simon et al. (1998); Kelly and Breinlinger (1996), and Klandermans
(2002) argue that group identification can actually be just as strong of a consideration for
someone who is deciding whether or not to protest as egoistic, cost/benefit analysis.
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One manifestation of collectivism is nationalism, in which citizens identify with the country
as a whole, and seek the wellbeing of the nation above individual wellbeing.
As shown above, egoism, or self-interest, cannot solely account for the motivations of
the Guatemalan upper classes in protesting in 2015. This implies that the upper classes
must have also protested due to motivations other than, or in addition to egoism. Following
Batson and Powell (2003), I argue that the scholarship’s inability to explain the 2015
protests is due to its exclusive reliance on the realist paradigm, and that to understand
cross-class protests more fully, other motivations must be taken into account. The two main
alternatives to egoism in the literature are altruism and collectivism. Thus, I expect to
find that the upper classes were motivated by a diverse set of motivations including egoism,
altruism, and collectivism. This leads to two competing hypotheses. The hypothesis based
on the extant cross-class protest literature is as follows:
(H1) The members of the Guatemalan upper classes who protested in 2015 were
motivated solely by egoistic concern for their own self-interest.
The second hypothesis is based upon the insights from psychology, which argue that altruism and collectivism also motivate individuals to act, and must therefore be included in
theories about human motivation. The second hypothesis is as follows:
(H2) The members of the Guatemalan upper classes who protested in 2015 were
motivated by a combination of altruism, collectivism, and egoism.
There is an additional hypothesis to consider as well. The fourth theory discussed
above explaining why cross-class protests are rare is organization theory. As previously
mentioned, whenever members of the upper classes do protest, it is typically as part of an
organization. Therefore, it is possible that the members of the upper classes who protested
in Guatemala in 2015 were there as part of organizations, which would provide an alternate,
though incomplete explanation for their activities. While such an explanation would not
18

directly conflict with either of the above hypotheses, it is important to factor in all of the
reasons why the upper classes protested. The third hypothesis is as follows:
(H3) The members of the Guatemalan upper classes who protested in 2015 were
protesting as part of an organization.
To test these hypotheses, I interview members of the upper classes in Guatemala. I
find that, although self-interest was one of the motivating factors, the motivations of the
upper classes were much more diverse than the current literature assumes. In addition to
self- interest, I find that some members of the upper classes have a deep altruistic concern
for the poor in their country, and a strong nationalistic sentiment. Thus, the upper classes
are not uniform rational actors, but rather a diverse group of people who are aware of, and
care deeply about the social, political, and economic problems plaguing their country.3 I
also find no support for hypothesis three, as organizations did not play a big part in the
protest activity for the people I interviewed, who had for the most part, spontaneously
joined family, friends, and co-workers.
To summarize my two-part argument, I first argue that the corruption scandal served
to unveil the autocratic distribution of resources in Guatemala, thereby increasing the cost
of repression, and showing members of the upper class that many of them were not among
the privileged class of elites to whom the government was distributing benefits. However,
this realization alone does not account for the fact that many members of the upper classes
actually took to the streets to protest a government that was about the be elected out
of office anyway. Additional motivations, not accounted for in the literature on crossclass protests in developing countries, must have been at work. Drawing on research in
psychology, I identify altruism and collectivism as two additional motivations that account
for the protests. In the following section, I explain and defend the methodology used in
this study.
3
Again, it is important to point out that this study is concerned with developing countries. The
literature on developed countries does consider altruistic concerns within the upper classes (Jasper, 2008).
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Chapter 4
Research Design
This study uses a mixture of interviews and questionnaire responses. Utilizing snowball
sampling, I interviewed 13 people in the upper classes in Guatemala who had participated
in the protests in 2015. I also distributed a Typeform questionnaire, to which I received 58
responses. The questionnaire contained questions that were similar to those asked in the
interviews, but were formatted as multiple choice questions. All interviewees completed
questionnaires, but many people who were uncomfortable being interviewed, or who did
not protest, also completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed through
Facebook and WhatsApp, the most efficient ways of utilizing long-distance snowball sampling. Interviewees were recruited using WhatsApp as well. The advantages of WhatsApp
are that the app is very popular in Guatemala, it offers end-to-end encryption, and it has
an option for video calling within the app, enabling the majority of my interviews to take
place through WhatsApp.
The questionnaire was used for three reasons. First, it enabled me to collect demographic information on respondents before the interview, thus saving time and enabling
me to focus on participants’ motivations. Second, it allowed me to gather responses from
people in the target demographic who were uncomfortable or unable to participate in an
interview, and responses from people who did not protest, permitting me to compare and
contrast perceptions. Third, it increased my sample size significantly. Though I do not use
the questionnaire data for formal statistical analysis, it enables me to increase my confidence in the representativeness of my interview sample because I am able to compare the
questionnaire responses from interviewees with others to ensure the interviewees are not
outliers.
Before continuing on to measurement considerations, it first remains to justify the
interview approach that I have decided to employ. Interviews are costly in terms of time,
they yield mostly qualitative results, and they are only able to generate a relatively small
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sample size. Therefore, I must have a theoretical justification for choosing this approach.
The main reason I decided to employ interviews rather than empirical methods is that
empirical data is inadequate and inappropriate for studying this case.
In trying to understand individual protester’s motivations for protesting, qualitative
interviews are useful because they are the best way to allow people to express their own
unique perspectives. Questionnaires and other methods of quantitative data collection
tend to impose interviewer assumptions upon the respondent through question wording
and framing bias. Allowing respondents to express themselves as they see fit, on the other
hand, reduces the interviewer bias effect. Further, this project is not seeking to confirm
or refute existing theories so much as it is trying to enrich and expand them. Therefore, I
decided to enter this project with an open mind and allow people to tell me what motivated
them to protest in their own words. Additionally Crouch and McKenzie (2006) suggest
that interviews are most appropriate when the interviewees have been through a unique
and/or traumatic experience. As shown above, the 2015 protests were unique in terms of
size, duration, and cross-class makeup.
In addition to defending the choice of interview, I wish to further clarify why I conducted long distance interviews over the Internet. This method has a very simple explanation. It is much more fiscally prudential to conduct interviews without traveling to
Guatemala in person. Video interviews have been well documented to be effective replacements for face-to-face interviews (Hanna, 2012). Because this project is a preliminary
investigation designed to justify a more thorough study, this method was the most efficient
and, hence, the most appropriate.1
Measuring the class variable proved somewhat challenging for this project. Determining
who fits in the target demographic of the “upper classes” is not easy. Class is a vague
concept that incorporates wealth and education, and is based in part on relations of incomes
1

In cases where the respondent did not have access to an internet video service, or in the case of technical
difficulties, an internet voice-only call was substituted. Though not as personal as a video call, the voice
call interviews were effective and no palpable deficiencies were detected.
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rather than hard numbers, making it difficult to measure. To further complicate matters, in
Guatemala there is a high degree of inequality, meaning that the upper classes are relatively
small.2 Because wealth is not something that most people are comfortable disclosing, I
use proxies.3 Torche, Spilerman et al. (2006) claim that both location of residence and
educational attainment are correlated with wealth in Latin America. Building on this, I
use these as proxies for socioeconomic class.
Guatemala City is divided into 21 zones; of these, there are 5 that are considerably
more expensive to live in than the others (OSAC, 2015). Thus, in order to get an idea
of wealth, I asked the participant which zone he/she lives in. Individuals are considered
wealthy if they live in one of these five zones. However, there are wealthy individuals who
live outside of the city, or even in poorer zones. Therefore, I use a second proxy, education,
to account for geographical outliers. Thus, I further clarify the upper classes as having
attended a university in Guatemala or having been educated abroad.4
Once participants were selected, and their answers to the questionnaire confirmed their
status as members of the upper classes, my actual interviews focused on discovering their
motivations for protesting. Out of eleven questions, seven were related to motivation and
perception of the state of affairs in Guatemala. I also asked about the importance of
organizations, whether other people they know had protested, and their previous protest
history.5 The next section of this paper will discuss respondents’ aggregated, summarized
perceptions, illustrated with anecdotes and quotations, about the motivating factors on
which participants focused.
2

the top 10% owns/receives over 40% of the wealth/income (Worldbank.org, 2015)
Even on questionnaires and surveys, people tend to lie about their income (Córdova, 2009)
4
I consider the proxies to act as an either-or; if participants live in an expensive zone they are still
considered upper-middle class even if they did not attend a university, and vice versa.
5
The full list of questions may be found in the appendix.
3
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Chapter 5
Interview Results
5.0.1

Who protested?

My first task in interviewing respondents was to confirm that there was a substantial
presence of people from the upper classes that participated in the protests. Though newspaper reports consistently claimed that the protests were cross-class, I wanted to confirm
that this was the case. To accomplish this, I asked participants if many other people in
their social circle had also protested. I defined social circle as friends, family, and coworkers. Most of the participants responded that the majority of people in their social circle
had protested. Although a few said that they were in the minority among people that they
knew, and that members of their social circle had not protested in great numbers. Overall,
it was clear from the responses that there was a significant presence of protesters from the
upper classes in 2015.1
A methodological concern may be raised at this point concerning the possible correlation of responses due to snowball sampling. If many participants are in the same social
circle, the responses indicating widespread protests by members of that social circle may be
exaggerated and not representative of the larger population. There are three responses to
this. First, although some of the participants may have been acquainted with one another
without my knowledge, I know of only three such cases for certain. The majority of the
participants were referred to me through my primary contact in Guatemala (herself not a
protester), but I have no reason to suspect that many of them actually know one another.
Second, this project is a preliminary investigation. Because of its limited nature, there is
certainly a possibility of correlated answers skewing the results. That is why the purpose
of this investigation is not to draw firm conclusions, but rather to justify a broader, more
extensive project to investigate these questions more thoroughly. Third, as mentioned pre1

One participant even claimed that the upper classes formed the bulk of the protesters, and were the
driving force behind them.
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viously, observations from newspaper reports had already asserted the cross-class nature of
the protests, so I was seeking affirmation of existing empirical data.

5.0.2

Protester Motivations

To understand what motivated the participants to protest, and to try to distinguish
between altruistic, nationalistic, and egoistic concerns, I asked questions relating the corruption scandal to the economy, which is where the interests of the upper classes are
generally assumed to lie, and to their feelings towards public institutions like healthcare
and education, which do not affect them directly because they can afford private alternatives. I wanted to find out if the respondents felt that the corruption scandal affected them
directly or not, and to what extent. For, if hypothesis one is correct, only the perception
that they were being directly and severely negatively impacted should have motivated them
to protest, while if hypothesis two is correct, they should exhibit motivations other than
self-interest. The motivations for protesting that respondents revealed to me are consistent
with hypothesis two, and are broken down into the three categories of interest: egoistic,
altruistic, and collectivistic/nationalistic.
•

Egoistic Motivations
As I briefly mentioned earlier, among all participants, the perception of systemic cor-

ruption was ubiquitous. Though some were surprised by the depth of corruption revealed
by the CICIG, every respondent declared that they knew the system was corrupt long
before the revelations of 2015.
Salma:2 I think the government was always corrupt ... They were just trying
to steal enough money to get them richer, but that’s, like, the whole history of
my country. Everyone that gets in the government, they will just try to steal a
lot of money. They will maybe do some work, but maybe just enough to keep
the country quiet enough to make us believe they are working, but they always
steal and they always do dirty things (sic).
2

All names have been changed to protect participants’ identities and responses have been edited for
length and clarity.
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It is not just that there are corrupt people in the government, but rather that the government itself operates on a system built around pervasive corruption. Several interviewees
characterized the government as a place where uneducated, lazy individuals can get rich
quick.
Jorge: The major problem that we have is the system. The system is built
for corruption ... Most of our politicians don’t even have a high school degree,
let alone an undergraduate degree or a master’s, so they know what they are
going into. They know that’s the easiest way for them to make money ... In
the Education Department, they were actually paying, I don’t know, I think
it was 68 people who died about a decade ago, and they’ve been paying them
every month for the past decade ... and all the country, and all the ministers
are doing the same thing. They’re not cleaning up the system. That’s the main
issue in Guatemala.
Jorge also stated that it is necessary to pay a bribe to get anything done by the government,
even such things a routine permitting. He claimed that it was choking economic growth
because one couldn’t start a business without paying off government officials.
The perceptions of government corruption extended to government institutions as well.
Participants told me that the police, healthcare, and education were all bloated with institutionalized corruption. One has to pay bribes to the police for them to investigate
crimes, and many of the policemen have been bought by organized crime, primarily drug
cartels. Two participants told me that hundreds of bus drivers had been killed in recent
years because they refused to pay off the street gangs that controlled their bus routes.
Gabriela: There are a lot of gangs in some zones of the city, and the extortion
is one of the big crimes. A lot of pilots of the transportation (bus drivers) are
being killed because they don’t pay for the extortion. And kidnapping is also
becoming popular again. So I think our city is not safe. I have to be very
careful all the time. And it’s not getting better. The police is corrupted, and
you cannot trust in them (sic).
Crime is so bad in the city that many participants told me they were afraid to walk anywhere
in the city, day or night.
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Maria: I don’t feel safe going out on the street, not even near my house. And
I feel I’m at risk always, and you always have to lock your car, and you always
hear about someone assaulting someone and someone dying from extortions
and things. It’s really bad, a lot of people that you know do not use the public
transportation system because of that.

Jorge: The problem is that you cannot go into the streets with a cellphone or a
computer; you will get mugged, literally. If you’re lucky you’ll just get mugged.
Several respondents reported that they had been robbed, or that they knew people who had
been robbed. Alessandra told me that she has her windows on her car completely tinted
so that no one can see inside, and she doesn’t roll-down her windows while driving. She
also claimed that she was constantly afraid while traveling in the city, calling it “a constant
paranoia.” Oscar told me that three days before my interview, he had seen someone robbed
at gunpoint by thieves on motorcycles. He also said that in his 20 year marriage, his home
had been broken into three or four times, and many of his relatives had also been victims
of crime. He thought that the country was heading into another civil war, and that it had
already begun in certain neighborhoods.
I also asked interviewees about their perceptions of the overall economy. None of the
participants said that it was in good shape; about half viewed the economy as moderately
good, while the other half considered it to be in bad shape. In general, those with more
sophisticated knowledge of the economy tended to perceive it as being in worse shape than
those who were less informed. One major concern was that businesses would be reluctant
to invest in Guatemala due to concerns about corruption.
Salma: It (the economy) has had a lot of trouble because with all these things
going on with the government and with important people here in Guatemala, I
think that the investment here in the country ... it goes away. We don’t have
a lot of people wanting to invest in our country.

Maria: A lot of businesses don’t like to invest in corrupt countries because
they’re not stable, so it may have affected a lot of emprezas [companies] to
come here and invest in people because of the government (sic). It’s unstable
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in a corrupt government. You just don’t want to mess with it and go invest in
another country, I think.
Many participants were worried about a false economy; even though their currency is
doing well in the market, they said that the economy is propped up by immigrants in the
US sending money back to Guatemala.
Rosa: ... a lot of our stability depends on remittances from the US. So our
currency has not devaluated because we have a lot of dollars coming in from
migrants. And that’s why we get this false sense of stability. But the moment
that remittances stop coming in, we are going to go into a crisis right away, so
I think it’s falsely stable.
At least three participants were aware of the problem of inequality in Guatemala:
Gabriela: The National Bank says that we have national stability, but the
problem is that most of the wealth is in a small portion of the population. The
medium class is not the higher section of the population. So even though our
economy is stable, the distribution is not equitative (sic).
Others said wages had stagnated while prices were going up. Elena attributed the inflation
to large amounts of drug money that was artificially boosting the economy and increasing
demand. Several complained about paying what they considered to be high taxes when
the money was being stolen.
Maria: I see everyday the prices are going higher, the taxes you pay, you don’t
see the results, so people that pay taxes have to pay high prices for everything
because everything is going up and, you know, jobs are hard to get so I would
say the economy’s not good.
Marisela said that only people in Guatemala City actually pay income taxes, which places
an undue burden on entrepreneurs like herself.
Marisela: I have a small company. Do you know every time it’s time to pay
taxes and they take away from my work almost 30%! And I’m like, you know,
this is horrible, like, it’s 30% that they’re taking from me and I don’t see it
invested in anywhere. You know, there’s no education, there’s nothing, so it’s
like, why would I want to pay taxes if I just think everybody’s stealing my
money, you know (sic)?
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Overall, the views on the economy were negative, especially on the question of paying taxes,
but no one seemed to think that there was anything like an economic crisis in Guatemala.
All of these findings are consistent with the literature. As mentioned previously, the
opposed interests of the upper and lower classes manifests itself in the issue of how much
taxes the upper classes should pay. In a study of European taxpayers, Svallfors (2013)
finds that taxpayers are much more willing to pay higher taxes if they perceive government
institutions as being fair and efficient, and much less willing if the opposite is true, while
Ortega, Ronconi and Sanguinetti (2016) find that improving public institutions can be a
good way to increase tax revenues. Further, self-interested motivations concerning personal
safety due to high crime are consistent with the findings of Romero, Magaloni and Dı́azCayeros (2014), who argue that when people lose faith in the government’s ability to
fight crime, they cease to support the government, especially if they have themselves been
victims of crime. However, neither discontent with taxes, nor perceptions endemic of
corruption, nor high crime are enough, by themselves, to motivate the upper classes to
mobilize against the government. The negative impact these factors have on the upper
classes is not significant enough because the upper classes are able to mitigate the harmful
effects by living in low crime areas, hiring security, and having surplus income. For example,
one participant, Maria, explained that she had once gone to a public health clinic to
vaccinate her child because the vaccines were free. However, she was so horrified at the
conditions at the public clinic and at the way patients were treated, that she went to
a private doctor for her next child’s vaccines. Thus, it is hard to argue that the upper
classes had a compelling reason to protest solely for their own self-interest when they can
bypass the failings of the state through private alternatives. The poor may have a life
or death stake in decrepit public institutions, but the upper classes are, at most, merely
inconvenienced by them. Certainly, these self-interested motivations cannot be compared
to the desire for regime change in an authoritarian state or during an economic collapse
that precipitated cross-class protest in the past.
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•

Altruistic Motivations
The scholarship on cross-class protest movements assumes that the upper classes are

rational actors. In this study, I find that the wealthy are not, in fact, one-dimensional,
rational actors, but rather have complex motivations that include altruistic concerns. To
draw this out, I asked respondents what they thought of public institutions like healthcare
and education, which do not affect them directly because of their socio-economic status.
Though I was previously aware of the deplorable state of these institutions, the respondents’ perceptions were unexpectedly visceral, emotional, and passionate. Additionally,
participants showed a high degree of knowledge of the ills that beset these institutions,
implying that they had taken the time to learn about them.
Perceptions of the healthcare system were utterly bleak. Every participant, without
exception, expressed horror at the state of public healthcare in Guatemala. Elena told me
that she went to bring her maid to the public hospital and the doctor sent her to go get
the necessary medications because the hospital did not have any. Many interviewees told
me that the hospitals often had no equipment or supplies.
Maria: ... there’s no medicines at hospitals. I have cousins who are doctors
and they cannot perform medical procedures in public hospitals because there
is no medical tools (sic).
Alessandra told me that in a rural hospital they were putting babies in shoe boxes because
they did not have any baby beds, and that the elevators at one of the public hospitals
break a lot. Oscar told me that the indigenous people try to have more children because
child mortality is so high.
What was surprising about the responses I received on the state of public healthcare
was the outrage and sadness expressed by interviewees. All of the people I interviewed were
wealthy enough to afford private healthcare, yet the emotion they expressed when talking
about public healthcare was palpable. They were angered on behalf of the poor in their
country who were victims of the poor healthcare system.
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Jorge: It’s poor people ... unfortunately the amount of greed we have in our
political system ... how would you sacrifice the lives of people just to make a
quick buck?
Alessandra told me with tears in her eyes about how angry she was that children were
dying in the hospitals due to inadequate care, and that in some hospitals there were rats
and cats in the basement, and stray dogs in the walkways.
Rosa was angered by the racism in the medical system:
There is a lot of racism embedded in the way decisions are made, so rural areas,
indigenous areas get no services, and the Ministry of Health has done nothing
to make sure that people who do not speak Spanish as a first language get
services in their language.
The prevailing sentiment was that corruption within the legislature and within the
health system itself was primarily responsible for the abysmal state of public healthcare.
Several participants were able to pinpoint corruption within the system. They told of
how corrupt officials would buy ineffective and expired medications for exorbitant prices
in exchange for bribes from the pharmaceutical companies. Elena said doctors sometimes
tell patients to buy their own medications, but they tell them to buy the wrong kind of
medicines, and then turn around and sell them on the black market. Others told of a
healthcare union that operates like a mafia.
Salma: My husband is a doctor ... he has worked in public health, so he
sometimes says to me, some of the big problems they have in the national
hospitals ... because all of the corruption that is going on with the president
or the health minister and all of these important people, it goes from the lower
... from the people that work in the very basic scale from the hospital, so
there are a lot of corruption from there in the hospital. There are a lot of
syndicatos [unions] and they manage the hospital and they also have ... these
things of corruption inside the hospitals, so it’s really, really hard for any health
minister that goes in to work because there is a lot of people wanting to get
rich or get some money and they don’t think about the patients or the health
in Guatemala, so its really, really bad. They don’t have beds, they don’t have
blankets, they don’t have ... they don’t have anything ... most of the time
the people, or the patients’ families, they have to go get the medicines or the
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bandages, or the serums, or the needles, or the ... anything they need to heal
or to help the patients (sic).
Salma also intimated that the healthcare unions and administration are linked to organized
crime in Guatemala, so healthcare workers are afraid to report corruption because they fear
for their safety. This was corroborated by other participants, such as Gabriela, a doctor
at a public hospital, who claimed that one time a cartel threatened to murder any doctor
who went to work one week at the hospital where she works. She said there was no reason
for it other than a display of power.
Jorge said that health contracts are closed; there is no competition, so the pharmaceutical companies pay off the government to get contracts, then overcharge for drugs.
Jorge The medicines that we are buying, they are highly overpriced. Let’s
say, um, an Aspirin. An Aspirin on the international market is less than 2
cents per Aspirin. Here in Guatemala, they’re selling it for 9 cents to 15 cents
per Aspirin. How come? The contracts are closed. Every year they’re just
reassigning the same contract to the same companies, so the owners of these
companies, the local pharmaceuticals, they’re literally paying Congressmen to
approve the budget, as well as the minister of healthcare. So we’re spending
way too much money on medicines that are really cheap, but unfortunately
we’re overpaying.
Another institution that was identified as decadent and corrupt is the public education
system. Originally I did not even include a question about the education system in my
interviews, but participants kept bringing it up on their own, so I added it to my question
list. With the exception of some work done by NGO’s to improve literacy, the perceptions
were uniformly negative. As with healthcare, a big complaint about education was the
poor conditions and lack of supplies. In rural areas, several told me, many schools do not
have tables, chairs, or desks.
Marisela: In some parts of the country, for you to go to school it takes you, I
don’t know, three hours to get to school. And you get to a school where there
are no desks, there’s nothing.
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Daniela said that some public schools are illegally charging people to attend. Others said
that some areas don’t even have public schools, so corrupt private schools are set up in
those areas by people who charge the poor and indigenous people to attend but don’t even
provide a competent education.
Another frequent complaint was the lack of qualified teachers and language discrimination. Many participants claimed that teachers are not properly vetted, resulting in uneducated, unqualified teachers being certified. Marisela complained that, though Guatemalan
law requires that teachers be able to speak both Spanish and the indigenous language of
the community in which they are teaching, many do not actually know the indigenous
language, which hurts the indigenous children who go to school but cannot speak Spanish.
Still others said that teachers are underpaid, and that the teachers’ union is very corrupt.
Many participants said that teachers go on strike multiple times a year, while others, protected by the union, don’t even attend class on many days. The result is that many children
in Guatemala miss weeks or even months of school. Several said the teachers’ union boss
has been in power for over 10 years and is very corrupt. Jorge said that the boss gets the
legislature to grant special privileges to the union in exchange for organizing the teachers
to demonstrate in favor of unpopular bills that the legislature wants to pass.
I have shown that the motivations of the upper classes to protest in 2015 were diverse,
and consisted both of self-interest and altruistic concern. Yet all of the previously mentioned motivations existed before the corruption scandals were revealed without resulting
in cross-class protest. I argue that the relationship between the corruption scandals and
participants’ motivations is akin to the relationship of the spark to the tinder. Without
the resentment and anger caused by years of corruption, crumbling public institutions,
high crime, wasted taxes, and a poor economy, La Linea may have caused a brief flare,
then gone out. Conversely, without the sudden revelation of the scandals, the tinder of
resentment and anger may have gone unlit for many more years. Therefore, it is only by
understanding the underlying perceptions of the upper classes that one can understand the
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protests of 2015. In the next section, I explore participants’ reactions of shock and anger
to the scandals themselves, and show how they served to push people over the edge.
•

The Scale and Audacity of the Major Corruption Scandals
The previous section demonstrates that there was a latent anger and resentment to-

wards the government due to the deplorable state of public healthcare, education, crime
prevention, and a weak economy. Most interviewees expressed frustration that they knew
corruption was happening and that it was slowly killing their country, but they were unable to do anything about it because it was never exposed; there were always rumors, but
never proof. Even with the corruption that they did have proof of, such as being asked to
pay bribes for government services, there was no agency to which to appeal. The police
were corrupt, the legislature was corrupt, the unions were corrupt, private businesses were
corrupt, so to whom could one appeal for change? This tension was boiling just below the
surface when the CICIG first exposed La Linea.
Many participants said they had mixed emotions when they heard about the scandal.
Some said they were not surprised at all, while others said that at first they felt shocked;
though they knew corruption was taking place, they claimed that they had no idea it was
so sophisticated, nor that it had been going on so long, nor the amount of money that had
been stolen.
Maria: I obviously felt shocked, but, um, not so shocked that, like, I couldn’t
believe it, like, you almost expect it from the government to be that way. But
somehow we saw it coming because it was so inefficient and so corrupt, so it
had to be something like that happening.

Gabriela: I was not surprised that they (the corruption scandals) exist, because we already had some hints that they exist. But I was surprised to the
level of corruption. It was not just a small portion, but was like millions and
millions, and distributed in an organized way, it rose to the top. So we were
surprised how organized and how much money they take from the states of
Guatemala (sic).
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As the scandal unfolded and the sheer size and depth became apparent, they became
outraged. News reports and social media posts began circulating articles that showed
just how much money had been stolen; corrupt officials pocketed millions upon millions of
dollars that could have gone to fix crumbling public institutions, but instead were used to
purportedly buy helicopters, yachts, and multiple mansions.
Marisela: A local medium did, like, little banners that would put into perspective how much money they had stolen. And they had, like, banners for how
many years of budgets for education, for health, for security ... things like that.
And when you would see these banners you would be like ‘oh my God that’s so
much money!’ ’Cause you hear about it, you know, but then you realize how
big of a chunk of money it is, you’re like, you just think ‘Guatemala is actually
not that poor’, you know?
Much of the outrage was directed at Vice President Baldetti, who had entered politics as
a relatively poor person, but within eight years had reportedly become a multi-millionaire.
Rosa: This administration in particular had been really on your face, they had
been parading their houses, their cars, their trips, like, Baldetti’s sons had been
very on your face about it (sic).
Additionally, the sheer audacity of the scandals angered people. Many respondents
said that they could hardly believe how little concealment had veiled the operation.
Salma: They didn’t try to cover the things they were doing. They didn’t care
about if all the things they were doing get into the news (sic).
They felt that years of legal impunity had left politicians feeling invulnerable. Respondents
seemed to think that the government was one nefarious cabal that protected its own and
consisted in large part of ex-military members who had previously done as they pleased
during the civil war and simply continued that behavior in elected office.
Jorge: The original story of how La Linea started was during the Cold War,
the late 70’s, and it’s been run by the military, by the colonels and the generals.
It was a quick way for them to, at the beginning, get the arms into the country
because we had embargoes because of the war. So that was the original intent:
to bring things through our customs without declaring them.
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•

Nationalistic Sentiment
Once the tinder had caught and the protests were underway, they expanded quickly.

As more and more allegations began to emerge, and in particular when the Social Security
scandal was revealed about a month after La Linea, thousands of protesters became tens of
thousands. Many participants told me the feeling of being at the protests was euphoric. It
was a feeling of solidarity and community that many had never experienced in their lives.
They told me that it was amazing to see rich and poor, ladino, European, and indigenous,
young and old, all coming together for a common cause. Several told me that it was the
first time in their lives that they had ever felt safe walking around the street. I describe
the feelings they explained to me as nationalistic sentiment. The normal distinctions and
cleavages that separated them, like class and race, melted away; they were all simply
Guatemalans. These feelings made them want to keep going to more protests, which fueled
the movement.
Marisela: I was in Zone 1 walking with all kinds of people, you know, like
from all social levels, ethnicities, and I felt safe. I had my cellphone with me,
I was filming, I didn’t feel afraid, when in another day, I would have felt, you
know, like, ‘oh my God, I need to hide my cellphone, or they’re gonna, like, rob
me.’ But that day I was safe there ... It was great to see the different types of
Guatemalans, you know, like probably people I would never share a chair with,
or, like, what do you call it, a bench? But, you know, there I was sharing my
bench with different kinds of people, so it was good.
Gabriela: I went and I saw a lot of my friends and my pals that were protesters,
but I also saw people that I’ve never seen in any way. I saw people from the
rural areas, I saw people from the universities very often. It was like the whole
country, it was not just my friends and my husband and my social circle. It
was, like, the people from very poor areas, people from the rural areas, people
that were very young, and people that were very old, so it was general.
Daniel: Do you think that seeing everyone there gave everyone a sense of, like,
solidarity and, like, coming together as a country?
Gabriela: Yes, definitely, definitely.
Daniel: And did that make you want to go back more? Did that motivate you
to keep going back to the protests, or was that not that important?
Gabriela: No, it was. Yes, I think it was ... well at the beginning it was
not very crowded, but I went a lot, and I was more motivated when I see that
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more people were congregated, and were from different groups, you know, even
religious groups, people from the private companies also were coming, so it was
like, not just public people ... so yes, people coming from all over made me
wanted to come more (sic).
Rosa: I was doing it (protesting) because I’m Guatemalan, and I’m fed up
with this type of behavior. And I’m fed up with the people that endorse and
allow this government to continue. I’m very aware that [the] private sector is
complicit in everything that has been happening because as long as they can
continue doing their business, they don’t care who is in power. My friend who’s
the importer ... approached the larger importers/exporters and said ‘lets get
together and make sure that this stops’ and they said ‘we don’t care, because
we have calculated the cost to us, and it’s more costly to get involved politically
so we’ll just pay the bribes.’ ... they (the government and private companies)
have turned their backs to what they know is happening; they know children
are dying, they know women die in childbirth, and they don’t care. And I think
many of us, the people I was protesting with, felt the same way. I mean I know
it affects us personally but we’re the elite. I mean, we’re professors, we have
good jobs, we are affected in certain ways; crime affects us, we cannot go out at
night, like there’s a lot of sexual crime, harassment, etc. We have all suffered
it, but we are definitely not the worst off from it, it’s just that it’s a horrible
system.
Several participants felt obligated to go to the protests for the sake of their children.
They felt that they needed to set an example so that the next generation would not be
silent, but would speak out against corruption. Many actually brought their children to
the protests so that they would remember the experience and know what it feels like to
stand up to corruption.
Salma: As a mother, it was important for me that my kids participate because
I think it is important that they learn and that they find spaces to speak out,
not to be quiet because of fear, because in my generation, we are used to these
things; like I was saying, we all know that the system is corrupted, that everyone
steals, that you need to pay people extra for them to do their jobs, and we keep
quiet, and we think that’s normal, and we think that’s what everybody does,
but it’s not right. So if we want to make changes we have to stop thinking like
that.
Even participants without children expressed a need to change the status quo. They said
that they were raised during the civil war, and were always taught to keep quiet and mind
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their own business to avoid government retribution.3 They said they wanted to show the
corrupt people in government that they are not afraid to stand up to them and throw them
out of office.
As is evident in the quote above, the language used when describing the need to protest
was not individualistic, but collectivistic. Though speaking about their children, several
participants referred to “my generation” and the need to change on a group level. It is not
enough for some people to protest. They felt that the entire populace needed to change
the way it felt about, and acted towards corruption.4
Accompanying the nationalist sentiments, many participants expressed feelings of hope
and relief that everything was being exposed. For the first time in decades, many felt that
they could actually enact change. Now that the international spotlight had focused on
the government, they felt empowered and even hopeful that real change could occur. This
somewhat strange mixture of hope and anger helped to fuel the protests. Now that they
had a name and a face for the corruption that they already knew was occurring, they felt
that they could no longer keep silent.
The nationalist sentiments and altruistic concerns demonstrated by interviewees also
cast doubt on another assumption within the literature, namely, that the upper classes
identify only with members of their own class and may be treated as a unified actor (Slater,
2009). My interviews reveal that this assumption does not fit reality, and that the upper
classes have complex motivations and can personally identify with individuals and groups
beyond their own socio-economic class. In fact, it was just such an ability to identify with
the poor and the country as a whole that motivated many of them to protest. For example,
Marisela told me about her family’s maid who had been with them for many years:
Marisela: For me, my personal connection is Paula and her family ... I was
lucky to be born in a house where I had education, you know, I had opportunity,
3

During the civil war, political violence in the form of disappearances, murders, beatings, kidnappings,
arson, and targeting family members was commonplace in Guatemala.
4
Also of note is the belief expressed by participants that their own, and previous generations passively
acquiesced to the status quo of corruption is in keeping with findings in the literature (Alves, 2001).
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but it was really pure luck; I didn’t choose to be here, I’m not here on merit, it
was pure luck. But when you have someone you love so much, and she wasn’t
born that way, and had been limited because of where she was born. That
just, like, bothers me. And, for example, Camila (Paula’s daughter) is going
to school because my mom put her in school, and things like that. And she’s
brilliant, you know, she’s such a smart girl. But then thinking about ... imagine
if we weren’t here, what would be of her, you know? Like, it shouldn’t ... this
is not alright, she should be able to learn and grow and be healthy without
having us, you know, just because she is Guatemalan. Like, that’s a right to
every human being, you know? So that was my biggest frustration. And also,
like ... seeing all the money and thinking about how different my country could
be if that money would be invested in the people, you know (sic)?

5.0.3

Organized or Spontaneous Participation

To test hypothesis three, I included a question that asked participants if they had
protested as part of an organization. Although several people did say that they had
protested as part of a group, most said they had not. Even the ones who had protested
as part of a group only did so occasionally, and in addition to protesting with family and
friends. Further, several participants were part of organizations, such as doctors’ associations, but did not protest as a part of those organizations. Some even made it a point to go
with friends and family instead of people that they work with, or with whom they were in
association. The organization theory literature refers to the need for existing organization
to sustain protests by clarifying objectives, rallying protesters, disseminating information,
and ensuring attendance at protests. These organizations are usually well-organized and
well-funded. I did not find that the few protesters who had protested with a group were
there because the group got them to go, but rather they went in order to support the
group, or because they knew people in the group. Thus, hypothesis three is not supported.
I believe that the feeling of nationalism and community experienced by protesters took the
place of formal organization. They were not protesting on behalf of any one interest group,
but on behalf of the country itself and its people. It was not a loose coalition of separate
interest groups, but rather a single interest group united against the government.
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5.0.4

Summary of Protesters’ Motivations

To summarize why members of the upper classes in Guatemala protested, based on
my interviews there are three basic sentiments that motivated people to protest: egoism,
altruism, and nationalism. High crime and high taxes frustrated many of the participants.
Many, too, felt a duty to protest on behalf of the poor people in Guatemala. They felt that,
although the corruption in institutions like public healthcare did not affect them directly
due to their socioeconomic status, they nevertheless should protest out of concern for the
poor who were being directly exploited by the corruption. Finally, there was a nationalistic
sense of duty to the country as a whole and to posterity to confront the corruption that
was choking Guatemala. Many participants said that Guatemala could be one of the most
prosperous countries in Latin America because of its wealth of natural resources, if only it
was allowed to flourish free from the cancer of corruption. To confirm these perceptions of
participant motivations, I asked a direct question of each respondent that inquired whether
they felt that the corruption scandal had affected them personally, or if they had protested
on behalf of others in their country. In confirmation of what I had already perceived, most
respondents said that they felt compelled to protest both because they were personally
affected, and on behalf of others in Guatemala who were affected, such as the poor, and
future generations.
Gabriela: I work in public health, so in that way I was directly affected. Also,
I saw there were other areas that were affected. The whole country was affected,
you know? You could see the poverty in the country from the, like, crime, bad
education, public health ... so I think I was affected personally, but I also saw
that it didn’t affect just me, but the whole country.
As predicted, these results do not support hypothesis one, but strongly support hypothesis
two, because protesters demonstrated varied motivations including egoism, altruism, and
collectivism, rather than egoism alone. Hypothesis three was also not supported because
most participants did not protest as members of organizations.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Under what conditions do cross-class protests occur in developing countries? This
project has demonstrated that the extant literature is inadequate to answer this question,
as exemplified by the protests in Guatemala in 2015. The literature claims that only under
conditions of economic collapse or democratic transition from an autocracy would the
upper classes find it it in their best interest to protest the government with the poor. The
literature assumes that the upper classes operate within a realist paradigm, and therefore
only protest when it is in their best interest. It further assumes that the upper classes
only identify with their own socioeconomic class and may be treated as a unified actor. My
results indicate that these assumptions are too simplistic and do not necessarily correspond
with reality. The upper classes may have complex motivations for protesting ranging from
self-interest to nationalism and altruistic concern for the poor. Some are able to identify
with the poor, as shown in the anecdote about Marisela’s maid.
Additionally, I have expanded the scope of democratization mobilization literature by
showing that the motivation for protesting a regime does not only come from the initial
transition from autocracy to democracy, but also from fluctuations within democracies as
they shift from one end of the spectrum to the other. A democratically elected regime may
still behave similarly to an autocracy by redistributing resources to a privileged few while
hiding within the shroud of democracy in order to decrease the cost of repression. However,
if this shroud is pulled back, as it was in 2015, upper class citizens may be motivated to
protest even a democratically elected government if they perceive that they are not among
the privileged few. While such a motivation is generally not enough to actually push the
upper classes to protest by itself, it may certainly be seen as part of the motivation.
This project does not aim to refute existing literature, but rather to enrich it and
increase its explanatory power. However, as previously acknowledge, these results are
preliminary. Due to a small sample size, these results cannot be extrapolated to the upper
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classes as a whole in Guatemala. It was my goal in this project to collect enough information
to justify a larger, more costly study, and in this, I believe I have succeeded. I have identified
the shortcomings in the literature and have laid out a blueprint for further study into crossclass protests and upper class motivations.
How might a more expanded study look? Ideally, a researcher would travel to Guatemala,
or any other country where cross-class protests have recently occurred, and conduct interviews with as many protesters as possible, from all socio-economic classes and ethnicities.
Interviews should be longer and more detailed than the ones conducted for this study, and
they should hone in more on perceptions of class within society, altruistic and collectivistic
vs. egoistic concerns, and the motivating factors that pushed them to protest. The interviews should be as open-ended as possible to allow maximum individual expression and
reduce interviewer bias. Contrasting the perceptions of the upper and lower classes will
help to illuminate the complex motivations that are at play in protest movements. It would
also be beneficial to interview people from the upper classes who did not protest to see
what differences they have from people who did protest. Understanding what prevented
people from protesting may help to shed more light on what motivated others to protest.1
In addition to a larger, more comprehensive study in the mold of this project, I also
urge future scholars of cross-class protests to challenge the assumptions of the literature and
think about the upper classes as complex individuals rather than a uniform, rational actor.
One intriguing question for future scholarship is whether altruistic concern has always been
a hidden motivation of the upper classes, or whether it is the result of a generational shift
in which people are embracing more liberal values. If the latter is true, it may be that
cross-class protests will increase in frequency within developing countries as more of the
upper classes embrace altruistic causes, as is the case in developed countries.
Finally, a related avenue of research that scholars should explore is whether the presence
of upper class protesters affected the effectiveness and peacefulness of the protests, as
1
For example, due to a miscommunication, I actually did interview one person who did not protest, and
she told me that she was cynical and didn’t think the protests would actually change anything.

41

Goldstone (2011) argues it did during the Arab Spring. It may not be a coincidence that
an unprecedented cross-class protest in Guatemala also corresponded with a successful
accomplishment of its goals, and a complete absence of violence, both of which have been
rare in Guatemala’s past. Perhaps the government feared to repress the people with violence
because so many people that the government relies on for monetary and electoral support
were present, or perhaps the presence of better educated, more affluent individuals helped
to keep the protests peaceful from within, and helped it to articulate its goal more clearly.
Given the longstanding assumptions in the scholarship regarding the motivations of
the upper classes, it is my hope that this study will lead to a better understanding of crossclass protest movements and upper class motivations, thereby enriching our understanding
of both the individual protesters and collective protest movements.
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Appendix B
Questionnaire, Response Summary, and Interview Questions
B.1 Questionnaire
1. What is your sex?
*Male
*Female
2. What is your occupation?
3. How old are you?
4. What is your ethnicity?
*Indigenous
*Ladino
*European
*Other
5. In what zone within Guatemala City do you live?
*Zone 10
*Zone 13
*Zone 14
*Zone 15
*Zone 16
*Carretera a el Salvador
*Another zone
*I live outside Guatemala City
6. What university did you attend? (choose all that apply)
*Universidad Francisco Maroquin
*Universidad Del Valle de Guatemala
*Universidad Rafael Landivar
*Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala
*Universidad del Istmo
*I attended a university abroad
*Other (in Guatemala)
*I did not attend a university
7. Approximately how many times did you participate in a protest against the
Guatemalan government before 2015?
*0
*1
*2
*3
*4
*5
*More than 5
8. Did you participate in a protest against the Guatemalan government in
2015, including both physical demonstrations and social media posts?
*Yes
*No
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If you answered yes to number 9, move on to question 10. If you answered no to question
9, skip to question 12
9. Did you participate in protests via social media, demonstrations, or both?
*Social media
*Demonstrations
*Both
10. How many times did you participate in a protest by demonstrating, using
social media, or both? [only one participation event per day]
*1
*2
*3
*4
*5
*more than 5
11. How do you perceive the rate of crime in Guatemala City?
*Very high
*Moderately high
*Neither high nor low
*Moderately low
*Very low
12. How do you perceive the state of public healthcare in Guatemala?
*Very bad
*Moderately bad
*Neither bad nor good
*Moderately good
*Very good
13. How do you perceive the state of the economy in Guatemala?
*Very bad
*Moderately bad
*Neither good nor bad
*Moderately good
*Very good
14. If you participated in a protest in 2015, was it a response to the La Linea
scandal and/or the social security scandal, or was it a response to something
else?
*La Linea and/or the social security scandal
*Something else
*I did not participate in a protest in 2015
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15. Due to tax money being taken by government officials, do you believe that
the La Linea scandal and the social security scandal had a significant
negative impact on crime, public healthcare, and the economy, a moderately
negative impact, or no negative impact?
*Significant
*Moderate
*None
*No opinion
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B.2

Questionnaire Response Summary Statistics

Below are summarized the aggregate data from relevant variables on the questionnaire:
Sex: 79% Female, 21% Male
Age: 59% (18-35), 28% (36-55), 13% (56+)
Ethnicity: 81% Ladino, 10% Caucasian, 9% Other
Education: University educated? 100% Yes, 0% No
Protest Participation: Participated in 2015 protests? 79% Yes, 21% No
Crime Perception 71% Very High, 21% Moderately High, 4% Medium, 4% No Opinion
Healthcare Perception: 93% Very Bad, 7% Moderately Bad
Economy Perception: 31% Very bad, 54% Moderately Bad, 12% Neither Good nor Bad,
3% Moderately Good
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B.3

Interview Questions
Question 1

Id like to hear your thoughts on the state of the Guatemalan government before the 2015
election. Do you think it was honest, corrupt, in general? Do you think it was getting
better or worse? Do you think it was doing a good job or a bad job?2
Question 2
What do you think about the state of the economy in Guatemala? How about the state
of the public healthcare system? How do you perceive the rate of crime in Guatemala
City? And how about public education?
Question 3
What do you know about the La Linea scandal that was uncovered last year? When you
first heard about it, how did you feel? What effect you do think it has had on the public
healthcare system? The Economy? Crime? Public Education?
Question 4
What do you know about the social security scandal that was uncovered last year? When
you first heard about it, how did you feel? What effect you do think it has had on the
public healthcare system? The Economy? Crime? Education?
Question 5
Thinking about the La Linea scandal and the social security scandal, do you feel that
these were surprising or unusual in how serious and extensive they were, or do you feel
that they were typical of politics in Guatemala?
Question 6
Why did you protest the government in 2015? Did you feel that the political scandals
revealed last year actually hurt the country in a quantifiable way, or was it just on
principle that you protested? Do you feel that the political scandals affected you
personally?
Question 7
Was social media important for the protests? Did you use social media to stay informed
and voice your opinions?
Question 8
Did you protest as part of an organization or group?
2

These questions represent talking points, not the actual way the question was worded. Actual question
wording varied according to the flow of the conversation.

53

Question 9
Did many other people in your social circle protest as well?
Question 10
Now Id like to talk a bit about your past. Have you ever protested before? If so, how
many times, how long ago, and in response to what event?
Question 11
Is there anything else about the topics we discussed today that, as a researcher, you think
I should know? In other words, are there any additional important pieces of information
related to the protests that you think I am missing?
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